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Insofar as decision theory is regarded as a device for application to empirical choice
data, it might be thought odd that it is based on axioms. ‘Laws of nature’, after all, is
just a metaphor unless we think, as perhaps Newton did, that units of matter operate
under divine orders. The father of modern decision theory, Savage took the view, made
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explicit following his confrontation with the nuisance from Allais, that his great
achievement is a normative theory for decision-making under uncertainty, a manual
advising agents how to avoid sequences of decisions that would undermine their own
welfare (Binmore, 2009). This is a comfortable attitude for economists, who unless they
represent themselves, increasingly unfashionably, as pure (or ‘mere’!) theorists, are
expected to provide policy recommendations. But in that case, the various axioms
involved in the subjective expected utility theory pioneered by Savage do not seem to be
quite on all fours with one another philosophically. An investment manager should see
at a glance that she needs to effect reform somewhere if an analyst detects a cycle in her
assessment of the expected values of some options. But why should she accept that she
is letting down her clients if it is pointed out to her that her preferences are not
complete, or that some of them are state-dependent? The economist could say to her:
you should worry about these things because the welfare advantages of subjective
expected utility theory are guaranteed by the totality of its axioms, and you can’t pick
and choose from among them. Monsters lurk somewhere, even if we can’t say exactly
what or where they are. Perhaps this should be convincing up to a point. But in fact we
know that some axioms can be relaxed consistently with welfare maximization. For
instance, if someone lacks complete information, and recognizes that data are likely to
be most sparsely drawn from the thin tails of outcome distributions where, respectively,
financial security for life and terminal ruin lie, she can sensibly prefer an axiom set that
allows for rank-dependent utility (Harrison and Ross, 2018).
Economists have another, complementary, attitude they can cite from their classic
literature, which seems particularly relevant in the experimental laboratory: the axioms
are assumptions that generate what Samuelson (1947) famously called “operationally
meaningful theorems”, that is, assurance of precise and therefore testable predictions.
Experience shows us where adherence to this philosophy leads : to ‘exposures’ of
‘behavioral anomalies’ (Thaler, 1992), and efforts to patch them that can result in
sacrifice of generality (Camerer, 1995; Binmore, 2007) or alternatively to general
theories, such as cumulative prospect theory, with too many free parameters,
consequently encouraging sloppy identification practice (Harrison and Swarthout,
2021).
2
These two aspects of axiomatic decision theory—its basis in normative idealization
and its generation of precise specifications—set up the context for Bourgeois-Gironde’s
admirably modest, conscientious, and useful book. Bourgeois-Gironde begins with the
premise that the axiomatic structure of decision theory is at least useful for clarity,
including clarity in empirical application—so, the Samuelson virtue, but not necessarily
Samuelson’s implicit commitment to a Popperian posture. Bourgeois-Gironde endorses
no fixed doctrine on the extent to which we should expect homeomorphisms between
the decision-theoretic axioms and discovered psychological structures and processes,
except to reject the view, as propounded by Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), that the
relationship between them is merely paramorphic. (The homeomorphic / paramorphic
terminology is drawn from Wakker (2010): a model identifiable in some empirical data
of interest is homeomorphic if its structure maps onto the underlying cognitive
processes that generated the data, and paramorphic otherwise.) He adopts a sensible
methodological principle that revealed preference interpretations should be adhered to
as closely as possible, but without the theorist being hamstrung by an ontological ban
on preferences as being anything other than summaries of actually observed choices—
the restriction that makes Gul and Pesendorfer’s position possible. This methodological
liberalism allows maximum openness to evidence from multiple quarters as Bourgeois-
Gironde explores ways in which the axioms can inform design of experiments and
experimental data can, in turn, motivate principled and controlled relaxation or
modification of the axioms. Traveling with such light philosophical baggage but a full
mathematical toolbox is indeed, in my opinion, best-practice methodology for
experimental economics.
3
Bourgeois-Gironde does not attempt to produce a comprehensive review of
applications of the axioms to experiments, but instead goes deep into three cases.
Bravo, again: the pay-dirt here is found by scouring the ground, not by looking down
from conceptual heights. The three cases are (1) interpretations of psychological
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cardinalism in empirically estimated utility functions; (2) experimental
accommodations of the axiom of completeness in expected utility theory given prima
facie incomplete preferences in the lab; and (3) experimental identification of state-
dependent preferences. These cases are not highlighted because they provide fodder for
any strong philosophical story that Bourgeois-Gironde wants to spin. Rather, they make
an enlightening trio because few experimental microeconomists who venture into
design innovations and estimate individual utility functions can avoid having to think
hard about them at least from time to time.
Each of Bourgeois-Gironde’s three main chapters follows a common architecture.
First, the author surveys theoretical issues with a view to isolating dilemmas. This is the
philosophical part of each chapter, but again I stress: the point is never to buttress a
prior conceptual framework, but simply to explain why the problem in question is
intellectually challenging in its own terms. Then, the economic literature is scoured for
potential working points of homeomorphism between the relevant axioms and
psychological structures and processes that predict observable choice effects. In each
case, one or two detailed theoretical innovations by other economists are selected for
deep analysis. Finally, each chapter ends with a “To the lab” section in which
Bourgeois-Gironde sketches an experiment that might efficiently shed light on the
leading modeling options and problems revealed by his preceding review. No chapter
concludes with a methodological manifesto or promotion of an over-arching strong
program. This is ultimately a book for experimenters, and for each of the three cases,
Bourgeois-Gironde has given them plenty to think about next time they face a design
decision that confronts them with the theoretical issue in question. The book concludes
with a small and tasteful dessert, a brief reflection on what experimental economics
might look like if its practitioners had a culture that took phenomenology, as opposed
to naïve folk psychology, more seriously.
5
The book, though short, is not an easy read. This is because although it provides the
mathematical details necessary for clarity, one cannot understand it by working
through the equations and skimming the verbal parts at speed. The verbal expositions
are lengthy and they are, in fact, the primary content. The English syntax in these
sections is not particularly natural, though it is usually formally correct. I got more
value out of the book on a second read, once I knew, from having digested the practical
messages of each chapter, what hinge points in the verbal reasoning I should
particularly be looking for. This is not a criticism. An economic methodology book you
can read once through and then put back on the shelf will probably at best have
supplied you with some slogans to pull out in your next casual conversation with a
colleague about methodology itself. By contrast, as said before, Bourgeois-Gironde’s is a
book that is supposed to help you think more deeply when you’re actually designing
experiments. So a reader who wants to get full practical value from it should persuade
her experimental co-authors to read it too.
6
I will say a bit about each of the specific case studies.7
The problem of cardinal utility arises from the fact that vNM cardinality does not
necessarily represent psychological cardinalism, that is, the effect on valuation of
experienced differences in intensities of riskless preferences. I here borrow terminology
from Mandler’s (1999) classic study of the relevant intellectual history; a reader who
reacquaints herself with Mandler before reading Bourgeois-Gironde will have behaved
efficiently. At one point in the chapter, Bourgeois-Gironde states the problem space in
which cardinality arises in a crisp formulation that resonates through his whole book:
utility functions perform a “dual role” of “representing preference relations and
rationalizing choice data.” ‘Representing’ here means: by reference to an explicit
representation theorem; hence the role of the axiomatic approach. Then the central
question for Bourgeois-Gironde’s literature review is: Can we realistically expect to
restrict the influence of psychological cardinalism on choice behavior in the form of a
novel representation theorem? After considering a number of proposals along this
track, Bourgeois-Gironde carefully considers Köbberling’s (2006) representation
theorem for cardinal differences in utility, and argues that when we assess potential
conditions for its application, we can identify specific points of trade-off between
“psychological realism and operationalization.” An argument follows to the effect that
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we cannot avoid the trade-off by abandoning resort to any representation theorem, as
some authors have urged. The “To the lab” section of the chapter first reviews an
attempt by Abellaoui et al. (2007) to use eye-tracking data to identify decision weights
in a rank-dependent specification of subjects’ utility functions under uncertainty.
Characteristically, Bourgeois-Gironde finds the result inconclusive but sufficiently
promising to motivate follow-up lab work. Finally, he presents intriguing work from his
own lab on the hypothesis that patients who suffer from brain disorders that interfere
with their emotional connections to past episodic rewards are more likely to follow
Savage’s orthodox advice in small-stakes Allais scenarios.
The chapter on preference incompleteness is the longest and most theoretically
intricate in the book. It addresses a philosophical problem and a methodological
problem, which in empirical application interact with one another. The philosophical
problem is that there is no obvious reason why a person would regard their ambition to
be rational as undermined by their failure to hold determinate preferences over options
they are unaware of. But the more important aspect of ‘rationality’ to the economist is
arguably that it allows her to make inferences from the assumption that an agent
chooses so as to optimize her welfare, and then incompleteness undermines the
confidence with which welfare optima can be identified. The methodological problem is
that incompleteness and indifference are difficult and sometimes impossible to
distinguish from one another on the basis of observed choices alone. These issues are
best considered not by reference to epistemically remote prospects, but in contexts
where one tries to estimate risk preferences. How finely must an agent discriminate
between measurably different probabilities before we pronounce her preferences
incomplete, as opposed to simply revealing ‘fat’ indifference bands? In his section on
models for empirical application, Bourgeois-Gironde reviews the following issues and
threads of literature: approaches following Aumann (1962) in representing
incompleteness through multiple utility functions; efforts at adjusting for
incompleteness by modifying axioms other than completeness, particularly transitivity
and continuity; and incompleteness as deriving from status quo bias. Models discussed
in detail are Bewley’s (2002) work on incomplete preferences arising from incomplete
beliefs (in addition to status quo bias) and the meta-rationality model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa et al. (2011), where agents interrogate themselves on
motivated discovery of completeness gaps and repair them. The “To the lab” exercise
adds an extra dimension of uncertainty, concerning the extent of indecisiveness over
time, to the experimental approach of Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2006), which offers
subjects opportunities to pay to defer their choices, in the expectation that their option
menus might shift. In this setup, indifference among options should not induce costly
deferral, while incomplete preferences might. The theory discussion shows that this
approach is compatible with a revealed preference model, requiring only theoretically
minor relaxation of WARP (the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference).
9
The chapter philosophers might find most engaging is on state-dependent
preferences. As Bourgeois-Gironde explains, state-dependence calls into question a
fundamental principle of decision theory, the assumption that preferences and beliefs
can be elicited independently from one another. (Savage’s theory depends on this being
possible in principle, but he was aware of the challenges it poses for effective elicitation
procedures; see Savage (1971).) Experimenters are increasingly alert to the interaction
of risk preferences and beliefs about probabilities, which has particularly important
effects on accuracy of estimations if one allows (as one typically must) for non-EU
utility, as in rank-dependent utility theory. For instance, in my lab, we incentivize
subjective belief reports, but in analyzing for bias at the individual level, we apply a
correction based on the subject’s lottery choices. This is compatible with revealed
preference, and with Savage’s axiom P3 as long as the risk preferences are held fixed.
The situation with respect to axioms P3 and P4, as a pair, is more complicated when
one moves to true joint estimation of preferences and beliefs. Bourgeois-Gironde’s third
chapter includes a longer and deeper philosophical section than either of the preceding
ones, because foundational issues are less easily isolated for local management where
state-dependence is concerned than with respect to cardinality or completeness. Some
methods of handling state-dependence put additivity of preferences into question, or
10
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raise difficulties for distinguishing between states and consequences. Other approaches
(set in the framework introduced by Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) involve appeal to
hypothetical preferences, and thereby may encourage departure, in empirical
applications, from revealed preference. Some theorists have been tempted to
metaphysical animadversions on what the concept of a ‘state’ comes to. Bourgeois-
Gironde sensibly resists this: a ‘state’, he argues, is best understood pragmatically as
whatever is sufficient to induce epistemic closure on a decision process. He reviews two
models in detail, Karni and Schmeidler (2016), which involve hypothetical preferences,
and Drèze (2018), which is compatible with revealed preference. These models in turn
inspire the two experimental approaches described in the “To the lab” section, which
identify state-dependence by following Drèze’s idea of providing subjects with potential
moral hazard environments featuring trade-offs that will be decided one way given
state-independent preferences and another way given state-dependent preferences. The
first experiment applies the Karni and Schmeidler model and thus requires
consideration of hypothetical preferences, while the second, directly implementing the
Dréze model, avoids this departure from revealed preference.
Bourgeois-Gironde has produced exemplary economic methodology here: rigorous,
practical, and addressing live concerns in contemporary economics. His book addresses
the integration of economics and psychology in a way that, unlike too much recent
behavioral economics, does not simply opportunistically import concepts across the
interdisciplinary frontier without carefully preparing them for deep integration into
their new theoretical contexts. Experimental economists can use ideas from psychology
without abandoning the axioms, and doing so is the road to finding relationships of
enduring significance, as opposed to isolated behavioral ephemera.
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